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This paper explores how far policy-makers understand the structure of the development industry, the 
perceived characteristics of developers and the extent to which such actors can be considered policy-
responsive. If these matters are poorly understood, the effectiveness of planning policy may be 
undermined, especially where the private sector is responsible for undertaking most development. The 
paper is based upon empirical research on the Scottish Executive’s perceptions of, and policy stances 
towards developers between 1999 and 2007. It finds that Executive appeared to have only limited 
understanding of what drives the development process or motivates individual developers and seemed 
unfamiliar with important differences within the industry, sectorally and geographically. Instead, ‘the 
notional property developer’ was incorrectly conceived as a malleable and potentially compliant 
partner with shared objectives to the State. The paper calls for a more thorough understanding of the 





Property developers are considered by many to play a crucial role in the production of the built 
environment. The public image of the developer, now shaped as much by daytime television as 
‘Rachmanesque’ accounts in the popular press, combines brashness with secrecy, confidence with 
greed. Such images would be mere ingredients of legend and novel were it not for intense political 
interest in the products of the development industry and in the ability of politicians to shape, regulate 
and stimulate development through planning and other forms of intervention.  
 
The importance of developers as a policy-relevant field is well illustrated by the longstanding use in 
the British planning system of the term ‘development plan’ and the more recent introduction of the 
term ‘development management’ in place of the better known phrase ‘development control’. In 
practice, both ‘development plan’ and ‘development management’ are clear misnomers, which reflect 
the mistaken view planners often hold of their own role and importance in the development process. 
 
1 Dr Steve Tiesdell, formerly Senior Lecturer in Public Policy in the Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, 
died on 30 June 2011, after a lengthy illness. He was fully involved in the research on which this paper is based, in preparing 
the original draft and in reflecting on comments from the referees. The final version of the paper was completed by his 
fellow authors, after Steve was taken seriously ill in July 2010 
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According to Faludi (2000), many planners inherently like to see themselves at the centre of the action, 
controlling or reining in other actors. Yet, where the private sector is responsible for the vast majority 
of development output, as in the UK, planners neither ‘plan’ nor ‘manage’ development, but rather 
intervene in its production. The British ‘development plan’ is thus essentially a regulatory plan, since 
a true development plan would allocate and programme resources to achieve specific developments 
intended by, and often under the direct control of, the plan-maker. Despite its more recent popularity, 
‘development management’ is no more than a euphemism for the well-established British system of 
development control, and again falsely suggests a more central role for planners than is actually the 
case. In the end, most development is planned and managed primarily by developers and associated 
actors, rather than by public-sector planners. 
 
It could be said that this terminological confusion is harmless, especially if it helps raise the morale of 
a much battered planning profession. In this paper, we take a different position. We argue that such 
terminological confusion reflects substantive practical confusion about how planners and developers 
can most effectively interact. Indeed, as planners increasingly engage in a process of bargaining with 
developers over the distribution of development gains, they require an ever more sophisticated 
understanding of development to help them realise how they might best influence developer activity. 
This makes it essential for policy-makers to understand the motives, behaviour and modus operandi 
of developers. 
 
The specific focus of this paper is on the Scottish Executive’s perceptions of, and policy stances 
towards developers between 1999 and 2007. The Scottish experience well illustrates the policy 
challenge faced in many advanced economies of seeking to manage urban change while greatly reliant 
for implementation on private-sector agents, about whom information may be limited. As a result, a 
‘notional property developer’ may be constructed by policy-makers to compensate for their lack of 
hard information on how real developers behave in practice. In the next section, we draw together 
what previous research from the UK, North America and Australia tells us about developer behaviour 
and the extent to which it is open to policy influence. The latter, we argue, tends to be implicit rather 
than explicit in the literature since specific relations between developers and policy-makers are not 
well studied. We thus specify two research questions to uncover what concepts Scottish policy-makers 
held about developers and what their implications were. We then set out our research method before 
presenting our findings in two sections, the first dealing with the Scottish Executive’s policy 
perceptions about developers and the second with its policy stances towards them. We conclude the 
paper by summarising our findings and reflecting on the research questions. 
 
2. CONCEPTUALISING THE PROPERTY DEVELOPER 
 
The substantive academic account of what typifies the property developer has still to be written. There 
are certainly good anecdotal accounts, written mainly from inside the industry, which reveal much 
about the behaviour and thinking of particular developers at particular times (see, for example Marriot, 
1967; Ross Goobey, 1992; Scott, 1996). Alongside these, textbooks provide comprehensive accounts 
of the entire development process, within which they accord varying attention to the developer’s role 
(see, for example, Havard, 2008; Millington, 2000; Wilkinson and Reed, 2008). Occasionally, there 
emerges a more reflective account of developer motives within a rich understanding of process, of 
which Fainstein’s (1994) classic exploration of property, politics and planning in London and New 
York is an excellent example. Nevertheless, such insights often tell us more about relations between 
developers and policy-makers than about the activities of developers themselves. 
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To conceptualise what is meant by a developer, we need to rely on shorter contributions, especially 
those made in recent years by researchers such as Michael Ball, Robert Beauregard, Eddo Coiacetto, 
Simon Guy, Patsy Healey and John Henneberry. This section draws on these sources in an attempt to 
explore what drives developer behaviour and to probe the extent to which it is open to policy 
influence. It starts by reflecting on the broad theoretical traditions that have been deployed to explain 
developer behaviour. It then examines the structure of the development industry, both functionally 
and geographically, before considering the perceived characteristics of developers as central actors in 
the development process. It concludes by exploring the extent to which developers can be considered 
potentially policy-responsive. 
 
2.1 Alternative approaches to developer analysis 
 
Accounts of developer behaviour tend to fall within the four main traditions in property research, 
identified by Ball (1998), namely, mainstream economics, power/behavioural approaches, structure-
agency institutionalism and structure of provision theories. These broadly reflect earlier approaches 
to understanding the development process (see reviews by Gore and Nicholson, 1991; Healey, 1991) 
which provide richly varied accounts of the importance of the developer in the production of the built 
environment. Most textbook explanations are implicitly grounded in mainstream economics and 
regard development appraisal as a fundamental operational tool by which developers attempt to 
mediate between supply and demand. This approach has been taken further in econometric modelling 
of developer decision-making, especially in the American literature. In recent years, emphasis has been 
placed on applying financial option theory to real estate development (see, for example, Bulan et al., 
2009; Grenadier, 1995). Bulan et al.’s (2009) study of 1214 condominium developments in Vancouver 
is particularly interesting, since it provides detailed evidence suggesting that developers delay 
construction at times of greater price uncertainty and higher market risk. This strong econometric 
tradition, however, has been much criticised for placing developers under the control of 
macroeconomic forces that leave little scope for individuality in behaviour. Coiacetto (2001, 45-46), 
for example, argues that:  
 
“Probably because of their underlying assumptions, the presentation and discussion of such models is 
sometimes characterised by a certain naiveté and isolation from real-life human machinations and 
manoeuvring. It would even seem that the simulations are not always clearly distinguished from reality. 
. . Such models, then, deal with developer behaviour without actually examining how and why they 
behave in such a way.” 
 
Turning to power/behavioural approaches, Ball (1998) regards the earlier focus of Marriot (1967) and 
Scott (1996) as good examples of ad-hoc institutionalism, where the success of individual property 
developers is attributed to their own personal characteristics and good fortune rather than to any 
market drivers. He sees links from these approaches to what he calls the conflict institutionalism of 
contributions such as Ambrose and Colenutt (1975), where the interests of the developers are placed 
in diametrical opposition to those of local communities, however defined. Here, planners are regarded 
as the (often unsuccessful) mediators of such conflict or even facilitators of developer interests. 
Conflict institutionalism, according to Ball, can be contrasted with behavioural institutionalism, most 
evident in research on the behavioural characteristics of landowners and financiers. 
 
Ball then mounts a strong critique of what he calls the ASH (Agency-Structure-Healey) model of 
development before re-affirming confidence in his own Structures of Building Provision theory. 
Healey’s work and especially her 1992 institutional model of the development process attempted to 
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link actor strategies and interests to the broader economic, social and political context and perhaps 
had more in common with Ball’s own approach than he realised at the time. While Healey’s interests 
moved on elsewhere, her insights into the ways in which developer behaviour both frames and is 
framed by the broader structural context can be said to have paved the way for more recent analysis 
of development cultures, pioneered by Simon Guy and John Henneberry. It is in the context of this 
more recent work that we now consider the policy importance of understanding structural 
disaggregations within the development industry. 
 
2.2 The functional and geographical structure of the development industry 
 
In the UK at least, there has been a longstanding distinction between developers who build new homes 
and those who concentrate on commercial, leisure and business property. Speculative housebuilders 
have been studied more than commercial developers, partly because of the policy importance of 
housing and partly because of the influential role of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and other 
research funders. As a result, the reluctance of housebuilders to innovate (Barlow, 1999), their reliance 
on a narrow product range (Hooper and Nicol, 1999) and their resilience to economic hardship (Gibb 
et al, 1995) are all issues that have been well exposed to academic research. The more recent and 
fascinating attention given by Wellings (2006) to the rise of the national housebuilder during the 
twentieth century emphasises the interaction of finance capital with personal ambition and judgement 
to explain the success and failure of individual developers over this period. It is arguable that the 
structure of the speculative housebuilding industry, at least in the UK, has evolved significantly in 
response to the changing policy environment (especially in relation to land supply shortages), with 
concepts such as ‘market capacity’ reflecting the current nature of state-market relations (Adams et al., 
2009).  
 
Although Havard (2008) points out that the recent trend towards city centre living has helped reduce 
barriers between commercial and residential developers, he still thinks the distinction important, while 
splitting the commercial sector into developer/traders and developer/investors. This echoes the 
fourfold categorisation of Adams (1994) who suggests that developers move along a path to maturity, 
starting out as mere dealers, gradually building a reputation as developer/dealers with the aim 
eventually to become developer/investors whose characteristics are not dissimilar from the pension 
funds and insurance companies whose direct involvement in the development process marks them 
out as investor/developers. This links to Keogh’s (1994) institutional explanation of the property 
market as a richly connected network between the user, investment and development sectors, with the 
developer seen to play a central role at the nexus of these relationships (Henneberry and Rowley, 
2002). Unlike speculative housebuilders, who generally build for owner-occupiers (a role that 
combines user and investor), commercial developer/traders aim to attract users as tenant and then 
sell out as landlord to an investor.     
 
From a North American perspective, Beauregard (2005: 2433) notices that “the disaggregation of 
property markets into sub-markets or sectors – also called property types - is so common as to be 
unquestioned and unexamined.” His explanation mixes the structural characteristics of a complex 
development market, in which “developers and investors in one sector are likely to respond to market 
signals at variance with their counterparts in other sectors” (Beauregard, 2005: 2433) with the agency 
need of individual developers to manage risk and contain their information requirements. Beauregard 
argues that the strong commitment of both developers and investors to place, as well as sectors, limits 
their capacity to switch across either geographical areas or property sectors. Similar themes are evident 
in Coiacetto’s work in an Australian context, where he draws an essentially place-based distinction 
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between two developer outlooks. He finds that “In the study area, one outlook is narrower, more 
local, but less exclusive and possibly more egalitarian. The other is more assertive, more worldly, more 
imaginative, more self-assured, less restrained and somewhat elitist” (Coiacetto, 2000: 369). 
 
There are notable links here to the influential contribution of Guy et al. (2002) who in their account 
of the regeneration of central Manchester make the important distinction between locally-based 
independent developers and nationally-based institutional developers. The distinction is essentially 
about ways of thinking and operating which determine what is and is not considered possible in 
particular local markets. Guy et al. (2002) argue that, unlike institutional investors, independents will 
contemplate smaller lot sizes, multiple tenancies and mixed uses. They “recognise the links between 
such social complexity and the urban vitality which is central to regeneration” (p. 1191), strive to add 
value through distinctive design and are able to offset development risks through collaborative 
projects and initiatives. 
 
The sectoral and geographical disaggregation of the development industry has important policy 
implications for it demands the necessary knowledge, skill and attitudes to move beyond the 
generalised conceptualisations found in so many policy documents such as ‘private sector’ and 
‘developer’ to enable a practical distinction to be drawn between place-based and non place-based 
entrepreneurs. This difference might certainly colour the approach of public authorities to entering 
development partnerships but it has broader significance at a time when the distinctiveness of the 
locale is seen to provide a competitive urban advantage. In short, the more planners see themselves 
involved in ‘place bargaining’ rather than development control, the more it matters precisely who is 
sitting on the opposite side of the table.  
 
2.3 The perceived characteristics of developers as impresarios in the development process 
 
Developers are often portrayed as impresarios, orchestrating the development performance by 
bringing capital, labour and rights in land together to create the right product in the right place at the 
right time (Goobey, 1992; Marriot, 1967). Fainstein (1994: 218) takes up this analogy arguing that “the 
development industry resembles the entertainment business more than heavy manufacturing in having 
a profound cultural influence, in the singularity of each item produced, and in the process by which 
the elements of a project are combined.” Many developers would no doubt take pleasure in Fainstein’s 
comparison of their business to that of film-production, especially with its connotations of glamour 
and excitement, along with the promise of undue riches for the best known celebrities. 
 
In reality, however, the developer’s expertise is often seen to lie in knowing the local market (product), 
spotting opportunities (location) and resolving constraints to make things happen when required 
(timing). So successful development is not solely about the old adage of ‘location, location and 
location’, but instead relies on broader knowledge of ‘product, location and timing’. What personal 
characteristics distinguish the successful developer from the unsuccessful one? According to Guy 
(2002: 252) “Knowledge of local market conditions, meshed with an almost ‘mythical’ instinct, is 
mobilised in entrepreneurial initiatives.” In his textbook, Millington (2000) produces a longer list of 
ten qualities needed to make a successful property developer, of which three (thorough knowledge 
and understanding of markets, construction and finance) relate primarily to the development process. 
The other seven are essentially aspects of personality and consist of optimism, imagination and 
practical vision, judgement, decision-making ability, courage and a ‘thick skin.’ Interestingly, having 
presented his original list at a conference, Millington recounts how he was approached by two 
prominent developers who suggested that the only relevant quality missing was ‘a sense of humour.’ 
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Such anecdotes seem to emphasise the importance of individuality to successful developers, 
encapsulated in the ad-hoc institutionalism criticised by Ball (1998), and appear to suggest that the 
industry is exemplified by such atomised behaviour that anyone with the right frame of mind can be 
successful. Certainly, as Coiacetto (2009) points out, development companies are often small 
organisations since one person with a phone and good contacts can potentially be just as successful 
in orchestrating the development performance as a large corporation. This suggests that to survive 
and grow over the long-term, developers mainly need the necessary anticipation and common-sense 
to avoid over-development in a downturn (Ball, 2002; Wellings, 2006).  
 
This might seem simple enough, except for what is commonly known as the ‘herd instinct’ among 
developers, with the potential to create waves of over-development at the height of an upturn, as each 
individual developer follows the rest of the crowd. According to Henneberry and Rowley (2002), an 
important cause of this is over-reliance on trend extrapolation in inflating profit expectations. The 
tendency among all developers “increasingly to use habit-persistence based appraisals as market 
change becomes more extreme” (Henneberry and Rowley 2002: 110) destabilises market conditions 
and can produce extreme market volatility. According to Barras (1984 and 1994), improved market 
information may ironically sharpen, rather than dampen, speculative responses, especially it fails to 
help developers anticipate their competitors’ reaction to market signals.  
 
What this collective form of development ‘misappraisal’ suggests is that individual developer 
characteristics might matter less than the collective psyche and that what Guy et al. (2002) term 
‘development cultures’ could be an important policy focus. Looking at the decision-making processes 
of London-based finance capital, they contend that their “operational culture is a unique embodiment 
of economic rationality and social action” (Guy et al. (2002: 1187) since investors’ own familiarity and 
proximity to ‘all things London’ appears just as important as formal analysis in accounting for their 
disproportionate property investment in London and the south-east. Even when London-based 
finance capital was prepared to venture further north to the regional capital of Manchester, its interest, 
according to Guy et al. (2002), was largely confined to the well-established central office core, in 
contrast to independent local developers, whose collective culture encouraged innovative schemes in 
fringe locations. To explain the herd instinct among developers or to account for the increasing 
importance of ‘fashion-based’ development, policy-makers may thus need to look well beyond 
individual developers characteristics and instead consider the institutional characteristics of the 
‘developer breed’, applying Hamilton’s (1932: 84) definition of an institution as “a way of thought or 
action of some prevalence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people.” 
 
2.4 Developer behaviour and the scope for policy influence 
 
The above discussion has four main implications for understanding both developer behaviour and the 
extent to which it is open to policy influence. First, it is important, even if somewhat obvious, to 
emphasise that developers are not necessarily policy-driven – market and site constraints as well the 
prevalent development culture, may be equally if not more influential in their decision-making. 
Secondly, developers may well see policy as a constraint, rather than an enabling influence. Third, 
since the development industry is both varied and specialised, there may be no single development 
culture, but rather a constantly changing spectrum of cultures as market, policy and site constraints 
play out differently across time and space. We thus echo Coiacetto’s call (2000: 370) for planners “to 
appreciate that different developers think differently and that this varies from place-to-place.” Indeed 
developer behaviour may well be far more varied than planner behaviour. 
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Finally, we suggest that it is important to look beyond those ‘heroic’ accounts of the developer, 
criticised by Ball (1998) as ad-hoc institutionalism. At an individual level, it is certainly possible to 
portray developers as the entrepreneurial movers and shakers of urban change, whose identification 
and pursuit of their own interests remain unrelenting. Yet, despite their characterisation as instinctive 
risk-takers, Ball (1998) emphasises the moral hazards caused by developers’ normal practice of taking 
risks primarily with other people’s money, rather than their own. We must therefore take a ‘relational’ 
not individual view of developer characteristics, in which we interpret concepts such as ‘market 
instinct’ within the prevalent set of power relations between occupier, developer and investor and 
indeed more broadly, between the state and the market. 
 
Two main research questions emerge from the above discussion as a focus for exploring ‘the notional 
property developer’ as a policy construct. These provide the context for the remainder of the paper 
and can be specified as follows: 
 
1. How far do policy-makers really understand the motives and behaviour of property developers 
or the structure and organisation of the development industry? 
2. Does a naïve view of developers potentially hamper effective policy intervention in the 
production of the built environment? 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The research presented here is derived from a broader project, which sought to identify the implicit 
‘property market policy’ of the Scottish Executive from May 1999 to May 20072. The research thus 
recognised that property is rarely the focus of explicit government policy, at least not in any holistic 
sense. Conversely, in planning, housing and transport, for example, strategic policy changes are often 
articulated in the UK through green and white papers, with their content subsequently translated as 
necessary into legislation, or reflected in spending decisions. In 1999, such aspects of ‘domestic’ policy 
were fully devolved to the newly formed Scottish Executive and Scottish Parliament. Although the 
devolution settlement reserved defence, foreign affairs, economic and fiscal policy and certain other 
matters to the UK Government, the concentration of our research on an important domestic policy 
makes the Scottish experience relevant to the broader debate on relations between governments and 
the private sector. 
 
The Scottish Executive was chosen as the focus for the research for two further reasons. First, it 
remained in settled political control (Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition) for the whole of the study 
period. Secondly, during its first eight years, the newly devolved Scottish Executive undertook a series 
of policy reviews relevant to property, including those covering planning, housing, transport and 
regeneration. 
 
The empirical research was undertaken in five stages. The first stage involved identifying all strategies 
and policies published by the Executive and relevant subsidiary bodies between May 1999 and May 
2007 with potential relevance for the property sector. Some 64 documents were identified. These fell 
into the five topic groups, shown in Table 1. 
 
 
2 In August 2007, the Scottish Executive was renamed the Scottish Government. Since our study period preceded that 
decision, this paper consistently uses the term ‘Scottish Executive’. 
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Table 1: Numbers of Scottish Executive Documents Examined by Topic and Year 
 
Topic Year of Publication 




1 2 - 3 4 2 1 3 1 17 
Housing 
 - - - - - 2 4 - 1 7 
Planning 
 1 1 2 2 4 4 10 6 6 36 
Sustainable 
Development - - - - - - 1 - - 1 
Transport 
 - 1 - - - - 1 1 - 3 
Total 2 4 2 5 8 8 17 10 8 64 
 
 
The second stage involved a thorough quantitative analysis of the content of the 64 selected 
documents. Bryman (2004: 181) describes content analysis as “an approach to the analysis of 
documents and texts (which may be printed and visual) that seeks to quantify content in terms of 
predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner”. Although time-consuming, this 
analysis proved a relatively straightforward task, and was undertaken in four steps: 
 
1. A set of 51 keywords was generated and arranged into eight groups3 (see Table 2). 
2. All 64 documents were searched electronically for these keywords, using the search function 
on Adobe Acrobat. 
3. Applying consistent rules, duplicate or irrelevant references were eliminated. 
4. Each keyword occurrence was assigned to one of four categories - simple description of 
events, organisations, existing law etc; market perceptions or understandings; possible future 
alternatives policies; and actual policies. Subsequent analysis focused on non-descriptive 
categories, in which a total of 562 keyword references were found4. 
 
To discover the Executive’s broad approach towards each keyword groups listed in Table 2, the third 
stage involved a more qualitative analysis of the context within which keywords appeared. Essentially, 
through a process of amalgamation, the extensive number of references found to developers, for 
example, was reduced to a much smaller count of 21 perceived policy themes and 8 policy stances. 
This work was matched by the identification of the overall balance of implicit property policy within 
 
3 The main reference source used to identify relevant key words was The Glossary of Property Terms (Estates Gazette, 1989). 
An inductive approach was taken to selecting those property terms considered most likely to be relevant to the research. 
These were arranged into the eight groups as a means to communicate the findings more effectively. Academic colleagues 
also working in property research were asked to comment on our initial findings and suggest other keywords that were 
missing from the first search. As a result, we subsequently checked several new keywords, including ‘capital value’, ‘debt 
capital’, ‘equity capital’, ‘market price’, ‘market worth’, and ‘rates of return’, but found that any references made to these 
terms were sporadic 
 
4 These were intended to provide mutually exclusive categories to enable the research to achieve its policy focus. A 
deductive approach was then taken to placing each keyword occurrence with one of the four groups. 
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Scotland between 1999 and 2007. For example, was policy predicated primarily on a ‘market failure’ 
view of the world and over-reliant on market regulation or stimulus? Preliminary research findings 
were thus drafted. 
 
Table 2: Keyword Search Terms by Group 
 






Real estate developer(s) 
Real estate development 
Joint venture 





Group 3: Investors 











Tenancy or Tenancies 
Tenant(s) 
Tenure(s) 
















Real estate market(s) 















In the fourth stage, the preliminary research findings were presented to three senior civil servants, 
responsible for planning, property and regeneration at the Scottish Executive, who were interviewed 
individually and collectively to correct any factual inaccuracies in the preliminary findings and explore 
reasons for the policy stances taken between 1999 and 2007. None of the interviewees was surprised 
by our preliminary findings, with each offering some helpful explanation to confirm and contextualise 
what we had discovered. 
 
As the final stage of the empirical work, two focus groups of experienced property professionals were 
held, to which the preliminary findings were again presented and reaction invited. The focus groups 
were attended by some 22 property professionals, most of whom were at a senior or director level in 
property, planning or economic development consultancies, development companies or organisations 
representing the property profession or industry in Scotland. While both focus groups yielded valuable 
comment and some limited additional information, they too confirmed rather than fundamentally 
challenged the emerging research conclusions. 
 
As Table 3 shows, the research revealed the prominence of developers as a policy focus, accounting 
for just over half of the total keywords recorded. With this in mind, this paper now concentrates on 
how the ‘notional property developer’ emerged as an important policy construct for the Scottish 
Executive. We thus next explore the Executive’s policy perceptions of the developer before 










Actual Policies Total 
Developers 80 3 205 288 
Landlords/Tenants 46 4 53 103 
Markets 57 1 33 91 
Landowners 18 0 22 40 
Value 12 1 4 17 
Investors 10 1 2 13 
Taxation 1 1 4 6 
Funders 2 0 2 4 
Total 226 11 325 562 
 
 
4. POLICY PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE DEVELOPER5  
 
What did the Scottish Executive really think of developers, and of the extent to which their strategies 
and actions could be influenced? No single document offered an explicit answer to this. This meant 
that the task of discovering the Executive’s implicit perceptions towards developers was challenging 
and potentially contentious since it involved bringing together disparate material and providing some 
connecting interpretation to what was found. While we concentrated on those policy perceptions 
where the documentary evidence was strongest and most consistent, we were careful not to presume 
or necessarily seek consistency by unconsciously treating the Executive as a single undifferentiated 
actor whose policies were always well joined-up. This was why we subjected our preliminary findings 
to external review. 
  
As indicated above, the 80 keyword references to the Executive’s perceptions or understandings of 
developers were first sorted into 21 perceived policy themes. Each theme could be traced back to at 
least one specific reference in the 64 documents studied. These themes fell into four broad categories 
according to whether they implied a market shaping, regulation, stimulus or capacity-building 
perception of how best to relate to developers (see Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005, for further 
explanation). Table 4 shows how these categories provided a framework for analysis that allowed the 
21 perceived policy themes to be grouped, as appropriate. 
 
The four broad categories reflect alternative approaches by which policy might seek to change 
developer behaviour, namely: 
• Market shaping: through influencing the broad decision-making context of developers 
• Market regulation: through restricting developers’ freedom of choice or manoeuvre 
• Market stimulus: through impacting upon the financial calculations of developers 
• Capacity building: through enhancing the capacity of developers to contribute to policy 
delivery or the capacity of policy-makers to negotiate successfully with developers6.
 
5 Unless explicitly stated, the material in sections 4 and 5 does not distinguish between residential and commercial 
developers primarily because the Scottish Executive did not formally make that distinction, even though it can be argued 
that its policies were targeted more towards the residential than commercial sector. 
 
6 Our interest in this fourth category is with skill development for effective negotiation which is why this falls within the 
category of capacity building. As Table 5 subsequently shows, we place policies to extract greater community benefits from 
developers through planning agreements within the category of market regulation.  





Means of operation Number of themes 
identified in 
documents studied 
Main groups of themes 
Market shaping Influencing the broad decision-making context of 
developers 
6 • General confidence in capacity of planning system 
to influence outlook of developers 
• Responsiveness of developers to specific planning 
policies, for example on affordable housing, better 
quality design, & accessibility 
 
Market regulation Restricting developers’ freedom of choice or 
manoeuvre 
3 • Developers responsive to specific regulations on 
planning gain, renewable energy and transport 
assessment 
 
Market stimulus Impacting upon the financial calculations of 
developers 
5 • Development subsidies can change developer 
behaviour 
• Higher permitted development densities make 
development more viable 
• Uncertain remediation costs and unknown final 
user demand deter developers from vacant urban 
land 
• Too much vacant urban land in any one area may 
deter developer interest 
• More needs to be done to make developers fully 
aware of regeneration opportunities 
 
Capacity building Enhancing the capacity of developers to 
contribute to policy delivery or the capacity of 
policy-makers to negotiate successfully with 
developers 
7 • Better two-way communication needed between 
developers and the Executive 
• Developers need to be encouraged to ‘raise their 
game’ in quality terms, while planners need to 
become better negotiators with developers 
 
 
Overall, the analysis revealed that the Scottish Executive saw developers as essentially allies of the 
State whose objectives could be more closely brought into line by careful deployment of appropriate 
policy instruments. This view, which permeated many of the official documents studied, is well 
represented in the statement that “Effective planning involves partnership working, community 
involvement and dialogue and negotiation with developers to enable a high quality of development on 
the ground” (Scottish Executive, 2002, paragraph 5). 
 
We now look in detail at the four categories by which our analysis of the Executive’s perceptions of 
developers was organised. What becomes evident is primarily a managerial view of the development 
industry, which concentrates on how developers can best contribute to public policy goals and plays 
down the potential for conflict between developers and the State. 
 
Market shaping themes 
 
Market shaping policy instruments seek to influence the broad decision-making context of developers 
by reframing the context within which market decisions and transactions take place. At a national 
level, one important example of market shaping is a country’s particular system of property law7. 
Another, which accounted for most of the market shaping themes in our research, is a country’s 
system of national planning policy or guidance. 
 
In Scotland, six market-shaping perceptions of direct relevance to developers could be distinguished. 
These fell into two groups of three. The first group reflected the Executive’s general confidence in 
the capacity of the planning system to influence the outlook of developers, whether positively or 
negatively. Development plans were considered capable of steering developers toward broad areas of 
search where development was favoured. There were repeated comments that certainty and clarity in 
the planning system (a major aim of the planning reform process) would give developers confidence. 
Conversely, outdated development plans were seen as a prime cause of developer uncertainty.  
 
The second group of market shaping perceptions was much more precise and concerned the 
responsiveness of developers to policy intent. Two perceptions focused on the impact of planning 
policy on developer strategies. These suggested that to be effective, planning requirements both for 
affordable housing and better quality design, needed to be made clear early, so that they could be 
reflected in land prices. The final market shaping perception was the Executive’s belief that developers 
could be encouraged to think innovatively about accessibility by policy targets to promote modal shift 
in transport. 
 
Market regulation themes 
 
Market regulation affects the decisions of developers by restricting the set of choices available - either 
by compelling an activity, prohibiting it or prohibiting aspects of it. Development control is a prime 
example of this. Strangely, there was hardly any comment in the 64 documents studied on how 
 
7 Our research period coincided with the abolition of feudal tenure in Scotland and associated land reform that were 
enacted under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. However, these reforms were excluded from our research partly 
because most of the public debate around land reform took place under the auspices of the old Scottish Office prior to 
devolution in 1999. More crucially, however, the abolition of feudal tenure was seen by the Scottish Executive as a reform 
of civil law, rather than necessary as a property sector policy and indeed was preceded by a series of reports published 
from 1998 onwards by the Scottish Law Commission. 
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successful the Scottish Executive perceived development control to be in changing developer 
behaviour. In fact, the three examples of market-regulation perceptions were much more specific. The 
first suggested that a flexible approach to planning gain was inequitable, since larger developers had 
greater negotiating strength. The second identified the Renewables Energy Obligation as an exemplar 
of successful regulation. The third suggested that while developers may regard a comprehensive 
transport assessment as excessive, a more simple approach may not provide local authorities with 
enough information. Overall, there was little sense that extensive regulation of developers’ activities 
was other than a well-accepted role for the State. 
 
Market stimulus themes 
 
We found five broad themes about how the Executive perceived its policies might impact financially 
on developers, through helping them to increase revenues, reduce costs or contain risks. First and 
most directly, it was apparent that the Executive believed that development subsidies could change 
developer behaviour. Secondly, it felt that developers would welcome higher development densities 
since these would help cover high urban land costs. Thirdly, it considered that uncertain remediation 
costs and unknown final user demand deterred developers from vacant urban land. Fourthly, it was 
suggested that too much vacant urban land in any one area may create the fear of excessive subsequent 
competition from other new developments. Finally, the Executive seemed to believe that while 
regeneration activity showed developers to be opportunistic and risk-taking, more needed to be done 
to make them fully aware of regeneration opportunities. Overall, then, the Executive appeared to have 
some inkling of the potential of its various policy stances to render development financially more or 
less attractive, but these perceptions cannot be said to have amounted to a particularly sophisticated 
insight into what makes (or does not make) development viable. 
 
Capacity building themes 
 
The research identified seven themes which reflected the Scottish Executive’s perception of the 
capacity either of developers to contribute to policy delivery or of policy-makers to negotiate 
successfully with developers8. The themes could be divided into two groups. The first group of three 
primarily concerned the need for better two-way communication between developers and the 
Executive. These covered the recognition that the Executive needed to know more about the property 
development sector at the city region level, while acknowledging that those working in the sector may 
have found it difficult to interface effectively with the Executive, leading to the conclusion that 
developers do not necessarily appreciate the constraints of public policy. None of these problems was 
seen as particularly insurmountable. 
 
The second group of four addressed delivery issues more directly. Design competitions were seen as 
able to inspire developers and raise their expectations. Confidence in the potential of developers with 
the right attitudes, knowledge, confidence and skills to produce better designed housing was matched 
by the frustration that where developers lacked vision or were not challenged by planners, poorly 
 
8 The need for Scottish planners to improve their negotiating skills with developers was picked up by another study 
undertaken at about the same time, in relation to the provision of affordable housing through planning agreements. This 
argued that “planning staff are much less convinced that they have the detailed understanding of development economics 
and the commercial mindset needed to appraise deals and make prompt decisions. This is perhaps not surprising. Only 
two out of five authority staff reported that there has been training for housing, planning and other officers involved in 
the development and delivery of affordable housing policies” (Newhaven Research, 2008, p. 49). 
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designed places were built. This highlighted the perceived importance of capacity building within the 
public sector, reflected in the final theme that developers may have better negotiating skills than 
planners. 
 
5. POLICY STANCES TOWARDS THE DEVELOPER 
 
According to Kingdon (2003), public policy-making, at its most basic, involves setting agendas, 
specifying alternatives, making authoritative choices and implementing those decisions. Concentrating 
on the first two of these, he argues that agendas are set and alternatives specified, when ‘the three 
streams of problems, policies and politics’ meet and coincide. As this suggests, policy change requires 
a compelling problem to be linked to a plausible solution that is also considered politically feasible. 
This may well involve a reflective conversation between problem and solution, in which each 
influences the other (Schön, 1991). 
 
Policy perceptions, such as those identified above, help establish policy images or constructs, such of 
that of the ‘notional property developer’. Such constructs inform problem definition since as Kingdon 
(2003, p. 115) suggests: “Getting people to see new problems or to see old problems in one way rather 
than another, is a major conceptual and political accomplishment.”  If policy problems are 
misconceived, policy solutions may be hard to find.  Nevertheless, policy stances reflect far more than 
policy images or constructs. They emerge as the policy-makers develop their understanding of policy 
fields and policy challenges in a way that connects their own view of how the world works to their 
cultural constructs of those actors likely to be most instrumental in policy implementation, and to 
their appreciation of what policy solutions are likely to be technically feasible and ideologically 
acceptable.  
 
In this section, we attempt to articulate the actual policy stance taken by the Executive towards 
property developers between 1999 and 2007. We did not expect to read the 64 policy documents and 
find a readily available set of Scottish Executive policies towards developers. Yet, this should not be 
taken to imply the absence of particular policy stances, even if not expressly articulated. Nor did we 
necessarily presume immediate linkage between policy perceptions and policy stances, since as 
Kingdon (2003) argues, what achieves political prominence reflects a mixture of crises, events, election 
results, prevailing values and ideas as well as specialised knowledge and policy thinking. 
 
In this context, qualitative content analysis has the task of reading between the lines, of putting 
together and cross-checking passages from different documents and trying to decipher what the 
Executive was seeking to achieve. This must inevitably be a contested task, for in reading texts and 
assembling passages, there is much scope for argument about interpretation, if not about facts. So the 
approach taken here has been to indicate the scale of evidence we found in support of each perceived 
policy stance, by listing the number of separate supporting references in the various documents 
studied. 
 
Table 5, sets out eight policy stances towards developers, which our analysis suggested were pursued 
during our research period. Alongside each policy stance, we indicate the number of supporting 
references found, the broad policy aim and particular type of policy instrument deployed.

















1 Developers should participate in the development plan process (and in agreeing the means by which housing land 
allocations are monitored) 
3 Shaping 
 
2 Developers should make a greater contribution towards increasing the supply of affordable homes 8 Regulation 
 3 Developers should pay directly for new infrastructure capacity to overcome inherited constraints, primarily: 
• Accessibility improvements, including to major roads or junctions, public transport, town centre parking 











4 Developers should make a greater contribution towards the social costs of development, especially in the provision 
of public or semi-public goods such as: 
• Community facilities or community trust funds in areas affected by mineral extraction  
• Open space provision 








5 Developers should pay due regard to the long-term costs and benefits of development and not concentrate wholly 
on the short term 
• Avoiding waste, recycling demolition materials 
• Future ICT requirements 
• Flood risk (e.g. consider whether occupiers will be able to obtain insurance) 
• High environmental standards & management, both before and after opencast coal extraction 



















7 To foster trust, developers should communicate and consult more with local communities 13 Capacity-
building 8 Developers should seek to produce better designed and higher quality development 12 
 
If a single theme pervades all eight policy stances, it is that of ‘developer responsibility’.  As one 
publication midway through the period contended, “Some developers may be able to evade their 
reasonable responsibilities, others may be asked to make too large a contribution” (Scottish Executive, 
2003: 263). What is meant here is not the private responsibilities of developers towards their 
shareholders or other financial backers, but rather some broader concept of their perceived public 
responsibility towards the community at large. Developers were thus expected to participate in the 
development plan process, engage more fully with local communities, produce higher quality design 
and crucially contribute financially to ensure that their activities were for societal, rather than merely 
private, benefit. Indeed, private-sector development was seen as a lucrative source of funding for 
forms of community investment, which in previous decades might have been met by the public purse. 
As the final column of Table 5 shows, we suggest that these policy stances were to be achieved 
primarily through market regulation, with market shaping, stimulus and capacity building each less 
important.  
 
The first column of Table 5 further links the various policy stances to theoretical conceptions of state 
market relations in development (see Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005). Three broad policy aims can 
be identified. The first is grounded in a neo-classical perspective, in which the most important question 
for policy-makers becomes how far policy directly affects overall supply and demand. The second is 
grounded in welfare economics approach, in which the most important question for policy-makers 
becomes how far policy is able to overcome market failure. The third is grounded in the more radical 
‘political economy of institutionalism’, in which the most important question for policy-makers 
becomes how far policy can transform market cultures and practices. 
 
To summarise, the Scottish Executive appeared to have only limited understanding of what drives the 
development process or motivates individual developers and seemed unfamiliar with important 
differences within the industry, sectorally and geographically. Instead the ‘the notional property 
developer’ was conceived primarily as a potential partner, whose occasional inappropriate behaviour 
could be corrected and whose resources could be directed toward wider community benefit. While 
occasional developers might match this picture, most have many other characteristics, of which the 
Executive appeared unaware. In the final section of the paper, we account for this and to ask whether 




Scotland, like the rest of the UK, relies heavily on the private development sector to create the built 
environment. Yet, the Scottish Executive documents reveal only scant awareness of both the structure 
and organisation of the development industry and the varied characteristics of individual developers. 
Indeed, the popular concept of the developer as a risk-taking entrepreneur battling against bureaucracy 
(even if those risks are usually taken with other people’s money) was replaced in the Scottish Executive 
documents by one of the developer as a malleable and potentially compliant partner with shared 
objectives to the State. Against this background, we conclude by addressing the research questions 
posed at the start of the paper. 
 
Our first research question concerned the extent to which policy-makers really understand the motives 
and behaviour of property developers or indeed the structure and organisation of the development 
industry. We answer this by highlighting what appears to be a significant gap between the ‘notional 
property developer’ as policy construct and what other sources tell us about the development industry 
in practice. While some property developers may indeed see themselves as partners of the State in the 
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delivery of better quality places, many more consider their relationship with planners to be 
characterised more by conflict than consensus.  
 
The reasons for the mismatch between policy conceptions and reality are not necessarily 
straightforward. It may well be that policy-makers do not have the benefit of well-developed sources 
of intelligence to keep them abreast of the development industry. Certainly, while planners have long 
been able to draw on reliable social and economic statistics for the production of development plans, 
consistent property market information is much more recent in its availability, while the activities of 
the development industry still remain shrouded in mystery. It may also be that policy-makers rarely 
meet developers outside a formal work setting and that there are few effective networks to aid mutual 
understanding. It was also suggested to us that the dominant politicians in Scotland during our period 
had few personal connections with property development and little individual experience of the 
business sector 
 
Our second research question asked whether a naïve view of developers (which the Scottish Executive 
appeared to hold and which is probably shared by other public policy-makers), potentially hampers 
effective policy intervention in the production of the built environment. Here, we return to our view 
that terminological confusion matters, and that failure to understand the true nature of the 
development industry undermines is likely to undermine policy effectiveness. In Schön’s (1991) terms, 
it inhibits reflective conversations between policy problems and policy solutions. Indeed, as a practical 
example, to know whether the actual property developer across the table intends to retain and lease a 
proposed development over the long term or sell out in the short term, is the type of crucial 
information that would helpfully inform the negotiating position of the public sector. More widely, a 
realistic understanding of how the development industry operates is now essential to negotiating 
developer contributions. 
 
In conclusion, while we may be able to identify and explain how the ‘notional property developer’ has 
emerged as a policy construct, we would argue the case for a more thorough understanding of the 
development industry, and particularly of the cultural differences between different types of developer, 
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